GoFuckYourselves!
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Registered: Oct 2000
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This is slightly old news but appropriate reading for this thread, I believe:
Thomas Donohue of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce said of Kyoto that "if the U.S. negotiators were looking for a way to mess up the world's most prosperous and productive economy, this is the way to do it." Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott predicted Senate rejection. Meanwhile, John Adams of the Natural Resources Defense Council called the deal "a historic turning point." However moderate the Kyoto agreement itself may be, expect the political fight over its fate to be extreme.
Working nearly round the clock, Kyoto negotiators forged a treaty that asks Western nations to make the first effort ever to restrain emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases that may cause artificial global warming. The primary provision defies simple wording: By the year 2010, the United States would reduce greenhouse emissions to 7 percent below the level of the year 1990. European nations are assigned an 8 percent goal, Japan 6 percent. (At one point Japan swore it would not go beyond 5 percent. Vice President Gore placed a 2 a.m. call to Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: We've come so far, Gore argued, why let the world blame Japan for torpedoing the entire agreement over one percentage point? Minutes later, Japan's stance changed.) The vice president also managed to secure a major favor from negotiators: Reductions do not start taking effect until 2008--just when Gore would like to be cleaning out his desk at the end of a second presidential term.
Guzzling "utes." To satisfy the Kyoto agreement, the United States will need to restrain its greenhouse output by about one third in comparison with the levels that would otherwise prevail in 2010, by using a third less oil and coal. Accomplishing this will roughly require the country to repeat the energy-efficiency gains made in the aftermath of the 1970s oil crunch, when energy use fell by a third relative to the expanding economy. Compliance might mean, for example, new initiatives to improve the gasoline mileage of cars and trucks. Though impressive progress was made during the 1970s and 1980s, mpg trends are currently negative because of the popularity of gas-guzzling light trucks and sport utility vehicles. Under Kyoto, light trucks and "utes" would either need to show major mpg improvement or be restricted in some fashion.
Just what those restrictions might be is a mystery, since it is not clear how treaty reductions would be enforced--if at all. At the 1992 "Earth Summit," President Bush was heavily criticized for refusing to commit the United States to "binding" carbon reductions, and since then, "binding" has become the official adjective of global-warming politics. Kyoto delegates used the term constantly and have managed at least to create the impression that the current accord is binding. Sen. Larry Craig of Idaho, a treaty opponent, protested: "This is the first time an American president has allowed foreign interests to control or limit the growth of the U.S. economy." But on a close reading, the deal includes no enforcement mechanism, only a pledge to discuss the issue later. In the past, the United States and Western Europe have made dramatic promises about greenhouse-gas reduction, then simply never enforced them. The same might happen again. And an ultimate escape clause allows nations to opt out of the treaty altogether on one year's notice.
Central to the negotiations was the question of whether developing nations--which soon will pass the West as sources of greenhouse gases--would promise reductions. None did, with China denouncing the entire proceeding. A last-minute cable from Clinton to Jiang Zemin, promising that the accord would not undercut developing world growth, failed to move the Chinese leader.
Obviously, the eradication of poverty is a higher priority for developing nations than climate protection. But if carbon restrictions in the West only cause industry to flee to unregulated nations, the Kyoto treaty will backfire economically--while allowing total global emissions to increase anyway. Wary of such an outcome, the Senate has already voted 95-0 to reject any greenhouse limits that do not include the developing world.
Negotiators will meet again next November to attempt to bring nations like China on board. Until then, President Clinton may delay even the symbolic first step of signing the Kyoto accord--much less of submitting it to the Senate. This raises the possibility that Kyoto will become a media-age nonevent: dramatic, heated debate about something that never actually happens. If the accord is not ratified, global greenhouse emissions would almost certainly continue to rise. By about 2050, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide would reach double the preindustrial level, a point at which research suggests global-warming effects could be dangerous.
Many industries were upset by Kyoto, but not all. Greenhouse rules could revive the fortunes of nuclear power, since atomic reactors emit no air pollutants of any kind. Japan has already suggested it will meet Kyoto goals by building 20 new reactor stations.
Nor were business lobbies the only ones vowing to block the treaty. The United Mine Workers opposes the pact, since greenhouse enforcement could cause a downturn in the coal industry. Other traditional Democratic constituencies are no fans either. In many ways, the Kyoto agreement will replay NAFTA's political schisms--a Democratic administration pushing for a treaty that is generous to the developing world but could penalize U.S. workers in blue-collar sectors.
Alternative technologies. Yet if fossil fuels fall out of fashion in a post-Kyoto world, there will be new economic opportunities as well. The United States holds a competitive edge in the race to reliable solar power, gasoline alternatives based on agriculture, zero-emission "fuel cells," and similar technology. As a result of this edge, "Rational greenhouse reductions are possible without harming overall economic growth," says Stephen DeCanio, an economist at the University of California--Santa Barbara.
Economic impacts also will be softened by Kyoto's one diplomatic coup, earned by the American side. European nations--already more energy-efficient than the United States--seemed confident they could meet many additional Kyoto requirements not by making actual reductions but by trading with Russia for its store of carbon-emission "credits." (Kyoto gave Russia credits for greenhouse reductions already achieved by the closing of antiquated Soviet factories.) But European diplomats neglected to lock down this arrangement. U.S. delegation chief Stuart Eizenstat noticed the error and deftly forged a non-European alliance, including Canada and Australia, that will probably allow the United States to obtain the bulk of Russia's credits. (What favor the Russians may have been promised in exchange is not known.) European negotiators were left steaming.
Even if successful, the Kyoto treaty will have only slight environmental impact, as most greenhouse-gas emissions will continue unaffected. Bert Bolin, a Swedish climatologist, told the Kyoto conference that the treaty would reduce atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide by only about 1 percent. Even assuming Kyoto ratification, projections show total global emissions of carbon dioxide increasing by about 1.5 billion tons per year by 2010.
Thus the real objection to the Kyoto treaty may be less its economic impact than its inefficacy. But the agreement may inspire the kinds of changes that do matter. "All this emphasis on the percentage points in Kyoto targets and timetables is frivolous, since the numbers are certain to be changed later anyway," says Robert Stavins, a Harvard University environmental economist. "Whether or not governments make a basic agreement to act is much more significant than any specific detail." Today the ability to put greenhouse gases into the atmosphere costs nothing to businesses and consumers, so no incentive exists for the free market to devise greenhouse-friendly technology. If even mild rules on climate protection go into force, market thinkers, scientists, and engineers will turn their attention to the task of greenhouse reform and may create innovations ultimately more important than anything the present treaty seeks to achieve.
There exist several precedents for environmental initiatives that start off condemned in all quarters and end up successful. A decade ago, the Environmental Protection Agency asked petrochemical firms to reduce emissions of the 17 most dangerous toxic pollutants. Environmentalists called the program too little, too late; conservatives predicted financial disaster for the chemical industry. Instead, from 1988 to 1995, dangerous toxic emissions by U.S. companies declined 56 percent, even as petrochemical manufacturers hit record domestic production and enjoyed record profits.
And a decade ago, international negotiators meeting in Montreal voted to phase out chlorofluorocarbons, the compounds linked to ozone-layer depletion. Again environmentalists called the timetables too timid, while business advocates predicted catastrophe. Instead, world CFC emissions declined so rapidly that ozone-layer replenishment is now expected for the early 21st century. Manufacturers of air conditioners, refrigerators, and other formerly CFC-dependent products have adjusted so skillfully that most consumers are unaware the phaseout even happened.
As the Kyoto debate heats up, environmentalists are likely to see a conspiracy against nature, business groups to see a conspiracy against industry. But if the history of environmental initiatives is any guide, positive outcomes are possible both for the economy and for the Earth.
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03-30-2001 09:00 AM
